Custom Query (1433 matches)
Results (214 - 216 of 1433)
Ticket | Resolution | Summary | Owner | Reporter |
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#1278 | fixed | update-smart-drivedb: Older releases return *** BAD signature *** | ||
Description |
When calling update-smart-drivedb from smartmontools-6.6, it always fails: /usr/sbin/update-smart-drivedb: /usr/share/smartmontools/drivedb.h.error.raw: * BAD signature * Digging deeper into this problem by sh -x, I see: ++ gpg --quiet --no-secmem-warnin --batch --no-tty --homedir=/usr/share/smartmontools/.gnupg.12981.tmp --verify /usr/share/smartmontools/drivedb.h.new.raw.asc /usr/share/smartmontools/drivedb.h.new.raw + out='gpg: Signature made Sat Dec 28 22:44:15 2019 CET gpg: using RSA key EA74AB25721042C5 gpg: Can'\t check signature: No public key' + rc=1 There is a problem: smartmontools-6.6 hardcodes requirement of "Smartmontools Signing Key (through 2018)". But drivedb.h.raw.asc in the branch RELEASE_6_6_DRIVEDB is signed by "Smartmontools Signing Key (through 2020)". This cannot work. drivedb.h.raw.asc in the branch RELEASE_6_6_DRIVEDB has to use "Smartmontools Signing Key (through 2018)" forever. You have to extend validity period of this signing key, and then use that key for signing of this branch. Similarly, once RELEASE_7_0_DRIVEDB will be created, it has to be signed by "Smartmontools Signing Key (through 2020)" forever. And if it will not be created, you will go into unfixable problems in 2021 (version 7.0 will require a different signature than a future 7.3). In general, replacement of signing key every two years is not smart. It does not increase security, but paradoxically it decreases the security. New signing key has no trusted developer signatures, no trusted ring, so there are no way to verify that the key was created by legitimate developers. That is why I recommend to stop creating new keys every two years. Please create a well established trusted key, and when it will be required (e. g. signature considered as weak), add a signature to it. Developers should sign this key by their private keys, so people who have them in the trust ring could immediately trust this key. To decrease problems with future compatibility (e. g. extended key validity period, added signature), the script should update the key from the GPG network: gpg --recv-keys {key_id} This will also ensure security, as the possibly revoked key will be refused. |
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#1279 | duplicate | update-smart-drivedb: Older releases return *** BAD signature *** | ||
Description |
When calling update-smart-drivedb from smartmontools-6.6, it always fails: /usr/sbin/update-smart-drivedb: /usr/share/smartmontools/drivedb.h.error.raw: * BAD signature * It currently affectects version 6.6, but starting with year 2021, it will affect 7.0 and 7.1 as well. Digging deeper into this problem by sh -x, I see: ++ gpg --quiet --no-secmem-warnin --batch --no-tty --homedir=/usr/share/smartmontools/.gnupg.12981.tmp --verify /usr/share/smartmontools/drivedb.h.new.raw.asc /usr/share/smartmontools/drivedb.h.new.raw + out='gpg: Signature made Sat Dec 28 22:44:15 2019 CET gpg: using RSA key EA74AB25721042C5 gpg: Can'\t check signature: No public key' + rc=1 There is a problem: smartmontools-6.6 hardcodes requirement of "Smartmontools Signing Key (through 2018)". But drivedb.h.raw.asc in the branch RELEASE_6_6_DRIVEDB is signed by "Smartmontools Signing Key (through 2020)". This cannot work. drivedb.h.raw.asc in the branch RELEASE_6_6_DRIVEDB has to use "Smartmontools Signing Key (through 2018)" forever. You have to extend validity period of this signing key, and then use that key for signing of this branch. Similarly, once RELEASE_7_0_DRIVEDB will be created, it has to be signed by "Smartmontools Signing Key (through 2020)" forever. And if it will not be created, you will go into unfixable problems in 2021 (version 7.0 will require a different signature than a future 7.3). In general, replacement of signing key every two years is not smart. It does not increase security, but paradoxically it decreases the security. New signing key has no trusted developer signatures, no trusted ring, so there are no way to verify that the key was created by legitimate developers. That is why I recommend to stop creating new keys every two years. Please create a well established trusted key, and when it will be required (e. g. signature considered as weak), add a signature to it. Developers should sign this key by their private keys, so people who have them in the trust ring could immediately trust this key. To decrease problems with future compatibility (e. g. extended key validity period, added signature), the script should update the key from the GPG network: gpg --recv-keys {key_id} This will also ensure security, as the possibly revoked key will be refused. |
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#1522 | invalid | Long test never completes on Western Digital Blue Mobile WDC WD20SPZX-60UA7T0 | ||
Description |
I've just bought a Western Digital Blue Mobile WDC WD20SPZX-60UA7T0 and attempted to throw my health monitoring tooling at it (a set of PowerShell scripts that use smartmontools; the main test uses
After more than 24 hours, the progress of the test is still at "10% remaining" -- see attached file. I have to abort the test with When running an "extended test" with Western Digital's "Data Lifeguard Diagnostic for Windows", the test does run to completion -- see screenshots. Needless to say, I've never encountered this with any other drive. |